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CHALLENGES OF CONVEYING INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITIES TO JUDGE AND JURY
Caroline Everington*
The issue of defendants with intellectual disabilities (mental retardation)1 and
the criminal justice system is not new. The difficulties encountered by individuals
with intellectual disabilities (ID) in the criminal justice system was brought to the
attention of the forensic and disability communities over thirty years ago.2 Broad
issues facing defendants with ID entailed difficulties at every stage of the process,
from arrest to parole.3 Defendants with ID served longer sentences and had difficulty
attaining parole.4 Issues regarding defendants’ understanding of and participation
in trial proceedings (competence to stand trial) were raised.5 Lack of identification
of the disability by criminal justice personnel and clinicians was cited as a primary
concern, and a call was made for more accurate ID diagnosis and better training of
criminal justice personnel on the characteristics and needs of defendants with ID.6
The specific issues around capital cases and ID were brought to the attention of
the disability and forensic communities 25 years ago in Penry v. Lynaugh.7 While the
* PhD, Professor and Associate Dean, Winthrop University.
1 The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD)
replaced the phrase “mental retardation” with “intellectual disability” due to evolutionary
changes in perspectives on this disability. See AM. ASS’N ON INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF
SUPPORTS xvi (11th ed. 2010) [hereinafter AAIDD].
2 For the first text that provides a detailed analysis of the issues facing criminal defendants
with ID, see generally THE RETARDED OFFENDER (Miles B. Santamour & Patricia S. Watson
eds., 1982). See also James K. McAfee & Michele Gural, Individuals with Mental Retardation
and the Criminal Justice System: The View from States’ Attorneys General, 26 MENTAL RETAR-
DATION 5, 5 (1988) (providing a history of attitudes about mental retardation and a summary
of issues facing the mentally retarded in the criminal justice system); Wilbert Rideau & Billy
Sinclair, The Mentally Retarded Offender, 3 J. PRISON & JAIL HEALTH 101 (1983).
3 See McAfee & Gural, supra note 2, at 5–7 (describing difficulties mentally retarded
defendants often face).
4 Id. at 10.
5 See James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants,
53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 455–57 (1985) (providing a comprehensive overview of legal
issues facing defendants with ID).
6 See id.; see also Caroline Everington & Ruth A. Luckasson, Addressing the Needs of
the Criminal Defendant with Mental Retardation: The Special Educator as a Resource to the
Criminal Justice System, 24 EDUC. & TRAINING MENTAL RETARDATION 193, 194–97 (1989)
(providing suggestions for evaluation of persons with ID—including competence to stand
trial—and suggestions for training of criminal justice personnel).
7 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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Court declined to find an exemption from the death penalty for ID, it continued to
be a mitigating factor in post-conviction sentencing hearings.8 In the intervening years
before Atkins, disability professionals called for more accuracy in forensic evaluations
for capital cases involving defendants with ID.9 However, the topic received little
attention in the forensic community until Atkins.10
While Atkins gave the necessary procedural protections for defendants with ID,11
it also introduced an area of mental health for which the psychological and legal
communities were unprepared. This Article approaches the Atkins hearing primarily
through the role of the expert, as the clinical evidence presented is a significant deter-
minant of accurate judge and jury findings. It begins with an overview of the type
of evidence needed to prove a claim of ID followed by a discussion of the difficul-
ties in presenting this claim. The issues include (a) court reliance on experts who use
diagnostic approaches that are inconsistent with clinical standards for defining and
diagnosing ID, (b) legislative and court procedures for Atkins cases that are based on
stereotypes and inaccurate information about ID, and (c) unique evaluation challenges
posed by the Atkins claimant and the challenges in presenting that claim to judges
and juries.
I. EVIDENCE NEEDED FOR THE ATKINS CLAIM
For the last 50 years, the definition of ID has contained three essential elements:
(a) limitations in intellectual functioning; (b) deficits in adaptive skills; and (c) early
age of onset.12 While there have been wording changes over the years, the core elements
have remained the same.13 Contemporary definitions by the American Association on
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD)14 and the American Psychiatric
Association (e.g., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: Fifth Edition
(DSM-5)) define deficits in intellectual functioning (or general mental abilities as
8 Id. at 340.
9 See Caroline Everington & Denis Keyes, Diagnosing Mental Retardation in Criminal
Proceedings: The Critical Importance of Documenting Adaptive Behavior, 8 FORENSIC
EXAM’R 31, 31 (1999) (calling for better methods and procedures to investigate the functioning
of potentially mentally retarded individuals); Denis W. Keyes et al., Mitigating Mental Retar-
dation in Capital Cases: Finding the “Invisible” Defendant, 22 PHYSICAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 529, 532–34 (1998) (discussing detailed tests for assessing ID in defendants).
10 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304.
11 See id. at 317–18.
12 For a review of previous definitions of ID, see Robert L. Schalock et al., The Renaming
of Mental Retardation: Understanding the Change to the Term Intellectual Disability, 45
INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 116, 119 (2007).
13 Id. at 119.
14 See AAIDD, supra note 1, at 1 (“Intellectual disability is characterized by significant
limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in con-
ceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. This disability originates before age 18.”).
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referred to in the DSM-5)15 similarly and articulate common diagnostic features in
their classification manuals. For example, intellectual limitations are defined as a
full-scale IQ score that is two standard deviations below the mean on an individual-
ized, psychometrically sound test of intelligence.16 To increase test validity, both
associations endorse (a) IQ score adjustments to compensate for out-of-date test norms
and (b) avoidance of repeated testing (practice effect).17 For adaptive skill deficits,
individuals must display a significant deficit in one of these three areas: conceptual,
social, and practical skills.18 Both manuals suggest that reliability is increased by
using a combination of informal clinical assessments and standardized assessments
of adaptive functioning.19 Developmental onset is documented through interviews
and records review.20 There are noted differences between the two definitions, with
the DSM-5 placing less emphasis on the IQ ceiling and providing a richer description
of key attributes of intellectual and adaptive functioning.21
The objective of the expert is to provide an opinion to the court that is accurate, un-
biased, and based on current scientific knowledge and standards of practice in the disci-
pline, which in this case is intellectual disabilities. While both diagnostic manuals
provide standards for clinical evaluation of intellectual disability, accurate decisions
in these cases require a deep understanding of (a) uses and psychometric properties of
assessments of intelligence, academics, and adaptive behavior, (b) characteristics and
outcomes for individuals functioning in the mild ID range, and (c) the typical trajectory
of the disability, particularly prior to age eighteen. The purpose of this section is to
provide the reader with a brief overview of the standard of practice for the diagnosis of
ID in any setting. This will be followed by a discussion of deviations from these stan-
dards by evaluators and courts and the resulting consequences for the Atkins claimant.
The first prong in the diagnosis is the determination of significant limitations in
intellectual functioning.22 Assessment of intellectual functioning is much more com-
plex than merely administering an individualized intelligence test.23 Scores must
15 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DIS-
ORDERS: DSM-5 33 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5] (“Intellectual disability (intellectual
developmental disorder) is a disorder with onset during the developmental period that includes
both intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits in conceptual, social, and practical domains.”).
16 See AAIDD, supra note 1, at 10; DSM-5, supra note 15, at 37.
17 See AAIDD, supra note 1, at 38; DSM-5, supra note 15, at 37.
18 E.g., DSM-5, supra note 15, at 33–38.
19 See AAIDD, supra note 1, at 47–48; DSM-5, supra note 15, at 37–38.
20 See AAIDD, supra note 1, at 47–48.
21 Nancy Haydt et al., Advantages of DSM-V in the Diagnosis of Intellectual Disability:
Reduced Reliance on IQ Ceilings in Atkins (Death Penalty) Cases, 82 UMKC L. REV. 359,
367 (2014) (contesting the AAIDD and DSM-5’s conceptualizations of ID).
22 See Gilbert S. Macvaugh, III & Mark D. Cunningham, Atkins v. Virginia: Implications
and Recommendations for Forensic Practice, 37 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 143–44 (2009).
23 The two primary global IQ tests are the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale-Fifth Edition
(SB-5) and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV). See id. at 144–45
(describing the two tests as the “gold standard” in assessments of mental retardation).
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be interpreted in light of age, validity, and circumstances of administration.24 The
evaluator must understand the relative imprecision of these scores and inherent errors
in measurement.25
Historical records for Atkins claimants frequently display several IQ scores derived
from different tests given at different points in time. Of critical importance is an under-
standing of the importance of interpreting these historical IQ scores and the impact of
score obsolescence (e.g., the Flynn Effect26). The ID expert must be able to provide
the court with the most accurate estimate of intellectual functioning, which includes
employing Flynn Effect calculations when displaying IQ scores,27 and educate the court
on the scientific findings.28
Adaptive behavior, the second prong in the diagnosis, is “the collection of con-
ceptual, social, and practical skills that have been learned and are performed by people
in their everyday lives.”29 The diagnosis of significant limitations in adaptive func-
tioning is defined as a score that is at least two standard deviations below the mean in
conceptual, social, or practical skill domains on a standardized measure of adaptive
behavior that has been normed on the general population.30 The choice of assess-
ment is critical,31 as is the diagnostic procedures used and interpretation of findings.
24 Caroline Everington & J. Gregory Olley, Implications of Atkins v. Virginia: Issues in De-
fining and Diagnosing Mental Retardation, 8 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRACTICE 1, 8 (2008).
25 See Haydt et al., supra note 21, at 388 (discussing the difficulties in diagnosing ID).
26 The Flynn Effect, first introduced by psychometrician James R. Flynn, refers to the ob-
served gain in IQ scores over time. Norms for IQ scores are set at the time of standardization of
the test. However, the IQ of the general population increases .03 points per year. Therefore, a
person taking an IQ test 3.3 years after the norming of the test will score 1 point higher than
if they took the test the year it was normed. See James R. Flynn, Massive IQ Gains in 14
Nations: What IQ Tests Really Measure, 101 PSYCHOL. BULL. 171, 187–88 (1987); James
R. Flynn, The Mean IQ of Americans: Massive Gains 1932 to 1978, 95 PSYCHOL. BULL. 29,
32 (1984). For Flynn’s discussion of the IQ scores in capital cases, see James R. Flynn, Tethering
the Elephant: Capital Cases, IQ, and the Flynn Effect, 12 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 170
(2006). Mingroni speculates that the cause of this general increase in IQ in the population is
due to heterosis—matings between members of genetically distinct subpopulations. See Michael
A. Mingroni, Resolving the IQ Paradox: Heterosis as a Cause of the Flynn Effect and Other
Trends, 114 PSYCHOL. REV. 806 (2007).
27 See Geraldine W. Young, Note, A More Intelligent and Just Atkins: Adjusting for the
Flynn Effect in Capital Determinations of Mental Retardation or Intellectual Disability, 65
VAND. L. REV. 615, 661–63 (2012) (calling for mandatory adjustments of all IQ scores in all
Atkins proceedings).
28 See Mark D. Cunningham & Marc Tassé, Looking to Science Rather Than Convention
in Adjusting IQ Scores When Death Is at Issue, 41 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 413, 418
(2010) (recommending explanations of the IQ score, the impact of the Flynn effect, and the
corrected IQ score in capital mental retardation hearings).
29 AAIDD, supra note 1, at 43.
30 Id.
31 “There are at present perhaps four well-known and often-used standarized adaptive
behavior scales for the purpose of making or ruling out a diagnosis of mental retardation:
Scales of Independent Behavior-Revised [SIB-R], Adaptive Behavior Assessment System—2nd
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An accurate diagnosis requires an in-depth understanding of the construct of adaptive
behavior32 and its manifestation in defendants with ID. Key to this is the context of
adaptive skill assessment—the individual’s actual performance in community settings.
It is not based on a hypothesis of what the person has the potential to do.33 Assessment
standards require the use of interviews with credible informants who are able to provide
examples of the defendant’s independent functioning (or difficulties in functioning)
in the particular context.34
Interpretation of these findings requires an understanding of typical behavioral
expectations of individuals who function in the mild range of ID. For example, the
presence of a defendant’s strengths in some areas, such as having a history of steady
employment or possessing academic skills in the fourth to sixth grade range, is to be
expected and does not preclude a diagnosis of ID.35 Diagnosis requires synthesizing
information from standardized assessments with social histories, records, psycholog-
ical assessments, interviews, and academic assessments. Because this area can be con-
fusing to lay population, the ID expert must often assume a teaching role, educating
the court on the cognitive and reasoning issues inherent in the disability and explain-
ing how those interfere with functioning effectively. This is particularly true when
explaining difficulties in application of conceptual skills (e.g., money management)
and social skills (e.g., gullibility and acquiescence).
Standards for the final prong, developmental onset, require documentation that the
disability was present prior to the age of eighteen.36 This information is typically
Edition [ABAS-Z], Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales-2nd Edition [Vineland-II], and Adaptive
Behavior Scale-School Edition [ABS-S:2].” Marc J. Tassé, Adaptive Behavior Assessment
and the Diagnosis of Mental Retardation in Capital Cases, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY
114, 118 (2009) [hereinafter Tassé, Adaptive Behavior Assessment].
32 Marc J. Tassé et al., The Construct of Adaptive Behavior: Its Conceptualization, Measure-
ment, and Use in the Field of Intellectual Disability, 117 AM. J. INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 291, 292–93 (2012) [hereinafter Tassé, Construct of Adaptive Behavior] (dis-
cussing the history of the construct of adaptive behavior and its analytical framework).
33 See Caroline Everington et al., Challenges in Assessment of Adaptive Behavior in Capital
Cases, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: A GUIDE (Edward Polloway
ed., 2014).
34 See Patricia L. Harrison & Gina Rainer, Best Practices in the Assessment of Adaptive
Behavior, in BEST PRACTICES IN SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY V 605, 610–11 (Alex Thomas & Jeff
Grimes eds., 2d ed. 2008) (describing research about, and examples of, the importance of
interviews with people that know a child in different settings). For guidelines on assessment
of adaptive behavior in any context, see generally TERRY OVERTON, ASSESSING LEARNERS
WITH SPECIAL NEEDS: AN APPLIED APPROACH (6th ed. 2009); RONALD L. TAYLOR, ASSESSMENT
OF EXCEPTIONAL STUDENTS: EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCEDURES (8th ed. 2009).
35 See Daniel J. Reschly, Documenting the Developmental Origins of Mild Mental Retar-
dation, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 124, 133 (2009) (noting that many individuals with ID
are employed, though they may need significant support over time in those settings or their job
may be very simple).
36 See Stephen Greenspan & George W. Woods, Intellectual Disability as a Disorder of
Reasoning and Judgment: The Gradual Move Away From Intelligence Quotient Ceilings, 27
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gathered from interviews, social histories, and medical or educational records.37 An
understanding of the typical trajectory of the disability is important here. For example,
many defendants in the mild ID range may not have been diagnosed during the devel-
opmental period. Generally, school records will display evidence of academic diffi-
culties and often special education placement. However, special education placement
may not have been in a setting for students with ID.38
Understanding the multifactorial nature of the etiology of ID (biomedical, genetic,
and environmental) and the impact of these causes and risk factors on the development
of the individual is an important part of the diagnosis.39 Many ID disorders display typi-
cal phenotypical, medical, or behavioral characteristics.40 For example, understanding
of personality and behavioral characteristics of genetic disorders (e.g., Fragile X)41 and
syndromes (e.g., Fetal Alcohol Syndrome)42 is important in interpreting a defendant’s
past and present performance. In short, the role of the expert is to interpret all infor-
mation for the court in light of scientific findings on characteristics and development
of individuals with ID.
II. SELECTION OF THE EXPERT
A singular feature of Atkins is that it articulated a constitutional rule that relies
entirely on a clinical diagnosis.43 One of the most significant issues in this post-
Atkins era is the emergence of the instant expert or, as Brodsky and Galloway term,
the “professional immigrant.”44 In the years following Atkins, a significant number of
CURRENT OPINIONS PSYCHIATRY 110, 114 (2014). In contrast to AAIDD, the DSM-5 does
not specify a ceiling age (e.g., 18) in defining the developmental period. See id.
37 See Reschly, supra note 35, at 131–32.
38 See Edward A. Polloway et al., Mild Intellectual Disabilities: Legacies and Trends in
Concepts and Educational Practices, 45 EDUC. & TRAINING AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 54, 56–57 (2010) (discussing the political motivations for not diagnosing mental
retardation and the use of alternative labels such as learning disabilities).
39 ROBERT L. SCHALOCK & RUTH LUCKASSON, CLINICAL JUDGMENT 21 (2d ed. 2014).
40 For a comprehensive review of etiological causes, see A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 87-334 (Ivan Brown & Maire Percy eds.,
2007) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE].
41 Michele M.M. Mazzocco & Jeanette Jeltje Anne Holden, Fragile X Syndrome, in
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 40, at 173–87.
42 Irene Nulman et al., Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, in COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE,
supra note 40, at 213–27.
43 See Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing Atkins
v. Virginia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and Adjudications
of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 811, 813 (2007) (contrasting
the rule in Atkins with the typical role of clinical diagnosis in constitutional cases).
44 Stanley L. Brodsky & Virginia A. Galloway, Ethical and Professional Demands for
Forensic Mental Health Professionals in the Post-Atkins Era, 13 ETHICS & BEHAV. 3,
5 (2003).
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cases, many of which were post-conviction reviews, came before the courts.45 Of imme-
diate concern in the field was the obvious lack of preparation of forensic psychiatrists
and psychologists in this area, which was reflected in inaccurate opinions based on a
lack of scientific evidence and stereotypical beliefs about individuals with intellectual
disabilities.46 Misunderstandings included a lack of a basic understanding of (a) the
definition and diagnostic criteria for ID, (b) assessment of IQ and interpretation of IQ
test results, and (c) assessment of adaptive behavior.47 Because of court reliance on
clinical expertise and the lack of general knowledge thereof, these opinions have
been considered in many cases.48
One can look at the Atkins case itself to see a striking example of the lack of reli-
ance on standard assessment protocol and the employment of stereotypical notions.
The psychologist for the prosecution, Dr. Samenow, conducted no assessments of
intellectual or adaptive functioning, relying instead on two interviews with Atkins
and interviews with corrections officers.49 His conclusion was that Atkins was of
“average intelligence, at least.”50 It is likely that he came to this conclusion because
of a lack of understanding of the characteristics of individuals who function within
the mild disability range. A superficial interview will not uncover the significant issues
in comprehension and social judgment that are present in individuals who function
within this IQ range.51 An accurate diagnosis can only be obtained thorough stan-
dardized assessment and consideration of information from multiple sources.
Further, Dr. Samenow opined that Atkins’s problems in school were due to lack
of attention and motivation.52 This misinterpretation of educational records provides
an example of a lack of understanding of the developmental trajectory of this dis-
ability. Poor grades and grade retention are common for individuals with mild ID.53
Lack of motivation is a common characteristic as well.54 Many individuals with ID
45 For a review of cases where defendants with ID have been inappropriately excluded
from the protection of Atkins, see John H. Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from
Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation in Death Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
689, 691–94 (2009).
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.6 (2002).
50 Id. at 309.
51 See Martha E. Snell et al., Characteristics and Needs of People with Intellectual Dis-
ability Who Have Higher IQs, 47 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 220, 220–21
(2009) (describing general characteristics of individuals with an intellectual disability and
higher IQs and how individuals in this group are typically identified).
52 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310 n.6.
53 Reschly, supra note 35, at 129–30 (discussing the increased likelihood of grade retention
and poor grades for minors with mild mental retardation).
54 See David A. Ball & Edward Zigler, Personality Development in Retarded Persons, in
HANDBOOK OF MENTAL DEFICIENCY, PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND RESEARCH 143, 149–51
(Norman R. Ellis ed., 2d ed. 1979) (describing lessened motivation for those with ID).
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develop an expectancy of failure, which results in setting lower aspirations and
goals,55 as well as learned helplessness, which results in failure to exhibit any actions
to improve one’s situation.56 These can appear as a lack of motivation unless the issues
are probed further with the individual and others who have worked closely with him.
A commonly observed error is the reliance on screening or group-administered
intelligence tests that do not provide accurate measures of IQ. In Green v. Johnson,57
the expert used the Ammons Quick Test, which resulted in a score that was 10 points
higher than the score obtained by the Wechsler batteries given by other experts.58
The Ammons test is designed as a quick screening tool and is very limited in scope,
primarily measuring vocabulary,59 which is only one component of intellectual
functioning. Group-administered paper and pencil tests, such as the Beta III, used
in correctional settings, are also inappropriate for diagnosis as they do not yield
accurate scores.60 In the case of group-administered tests, there is the additional risk
that the individual received additional help or copied the responses of others.61
Even when appropriate tests are given and accurate scores achieved, inaccurate
conclusions can be reached. For claimants who have IQ scores in the 70–75 range,
it is not uncommon for an evaluator to diagnose a learning disability (LD).62 In part,
this is due to labeling found in school records and incorrectly interpreted deficits in
55 See id. at 148–49 (discussing research on expectancies of success and failure in individuals
with ID).
56 See John R. Weisz, Cognitive Performance and Learned Helplessness in Mentally
Retarded Persons, in PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT IN INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL RE-
TARDATION 17, 31–35 (Edward Zigler & Dianne Bennett-Gates eds. 1999) (examining re-
search on the relationship between learned helplessness and low performance in persons with
mental retardation).
57 No. CIVAZ:05CVR340, 2006 WL 3746138 (E.D. Va. Dec. 15, 2006).
58 Id. at *37. For an example of the use of this test in an Atkins proceeding, see id. at *1.
Fortunately for Green, the court did not give strong weight to the Ammons test results. Id.
at *60 n.8.
59 See David A. Ward & Charles R. Tittle, IQ and Delinquency: A Test of Two Competing
Explanations, 10 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 189, 195–96 (1994).
60 See Macvaugh & Cunningham, supra note 22, at 145 (providing an overview of the
use of the Beta test in corrections settings).
61 See id.
62 Learning disabilities are not the same as intellectual disabilities (for-
merly known as mental retardation), sensory impairments (vision or
hearing) or autism spectrum disorders. People with LD are of average
or above-average intelligence but still struggle to acquire skills that impact
their performance in school, at home, in the community and in the work-
place. Learning disabilities are lifelong, and the sooner they are recognized
and identified, the sooner steps can be taken to circumvent or overcome
the challenges they present.
NCLD Editorial Team, What are Learning Disabilities?, NAT’L CENT. FOR LEARNING
DISABILITIES, http://www.ncld.org/types-learning-disabilities/what-is-ld/what-are-learning-dis
abilities (last visited Dec. 1, 2014).
2014] CHALLENGES OF CONVEYING INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES 475
adaptive skills.63 As mentioned earlier, many individuals with ID receive an alterna-
tive diagnosis in school.
Perhaps the most disturbing evaluations have arisen in the area of adaptive behavior
assessment. Misapplications abound. One example is the use of assessments that are
not intended for this purpose such as the Street Skills Survival Questionnaire (SSSQ),64
which has been used in some capital cases.65 The SSSQ is a multiple choice test which
presents to the examinee pictures of common objects or actions.66 It is designed to
measure the individual’s knowledge of areas of adult living with an emphasis on prac-
tical skills.67 It does not yield a valid assessment of adaptive functioning because it
only measures knowledge; whereas, adaptive functioning assessment requires a
rating of actual performance in community settings.68 It is likely that a person in the
mild ID range can certainly identify a picture of a hammer, but may not have ever
been able to use one proficiently for repairs or construction. This is not to say that
people with ID cannot be employed in construction, only that this test does not mea-
sure that. Of equal importance, this test only measures skills in the practical domain,
an area where defendants in the mild disability range typically excel.69
Even when an appropriate adaptive behavior instrument may be used, violations
occur in the selection of informants, which invalidates the results. As in the case of
Dr. Samenow and other evaluators, corrections officers have been used as primary
informants on adaptive rating scales.70 As stated previously, the essence of the adap-
tive skill assessment is independent functioning in the community settings.71 The
prison setting is an artificial environment with severely limited opportunities to dem-
onstrate any skills.72 Further, such officers do not have the type of continuous contact
necessary for documenting skills. For example, even when skills, such as reading
a newspaper, are demonstrated, inaccurate conclusions can be reached. That is, just
63 See United States v. Davis, 611 F. Supp. 2d 472, 499–501 (D. Md. 2009). The court
found that the expert had erred in assigning a diagnosis of LD instead of ID. She did not
employ the correct definition and distorted information from adaptive testing. Id.
64 See Everington & Olley, supra note 24, at 9. (“For example, the [SSSQ] (Lindenhoker
& McCarron, 1983) has been used by some psychologists in capital cases to diagnose deficits
in adaptive skills.”).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See Karen L. Salekin et al., Offenders with Intellectual Disability: Characteristics, Prev-
alence, and Issues in Forensic Assessment, 3 J. MENTAL HEALTH RES. INTELL. DISABILITIES
97, 99–100 (2010) (providing examples of practical versus conceptual skills).
70 United States v. Smith, 790 F. Supp. 2d 482, 517–19 (E.D. La. 2011) (presenting the
problems associated with a psychologist’s use of corrections officers as her informants on
the ABAS-II, which is used to assess adaptive functioning).
71 See Tassé, Adaptive Behavior Assessment, supra note 31, at 114, 117 (describing the
challenges of assessing adaptive behavior in incarcerated individuals).
72 Id.
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being observed with a book or a newspaper does not mean that the defendant is able
to comprehend and explain what was read.73 A careful evaluator will probe the defen-
dant for comprehension as well as conduct collateral academic testing.74
Finally, one of the more troubling developments has been the published recom-
mendations by psychologists George and Kathryn Denkowski.75 The recommenda-
tions are worth noting as they are reflective of practices used by others in Atkins cases.
First, the authors recommend altering the scores obtained on the ABAS-II adaptive
behavior assessment for what they termed sociocultural-based score suppression.76
Second, credit can be provided for the items for which the evaluator deduces could be
taught or for which he or she thinks the defendant was not motivated to perform.77
Third, the authors suggest using the defendant as the informant for the adaptive test-
ing, stating that the family is unreliable.78 Fourth, and even more disturbing, is the
suggestion that the defendant be given “credit” for behaviors displayed during the
commission of the crime.79
These are invalid approaches that will result in an incorrect diagnosis of adap-
tive limitations for several reasons. First, there is no evidence that the ABAS-II or
other instruments are culturally or racially discriminatory.80 An examination of the
73 See Green v. Johnson, No. CIVAZ: 05CVR340, 2006 WL 3746138 (E.D. Va.
Dec. 15, 2006). In this case, one of the primary pieces of evidence of adaptive skills was the
fact that Green requested complex books while in prison. Id. at *51. The Court concluded
that, although Green had some limitations, he did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that he had significant limitations in adaptive behavior. Id. at *58. See also Tassé, Adaptive
Behavior Assessment, supra note 31, at 121 (highlighting that there is a misconception that many
people with ID cannot read, when in fact their reading comprehension can achieve a low level).
74 See Tassé, Adaptive Behavior Assessment, supra note 31, at 121 (emphasizing that
the diagnosis of ID must be made through a “rigorous and comprehensive” evaluation by a
professional).
75 See George C. Denkowski & Kathryn M. Denkowski, Adaptive Behavior Assessment
of Criminal Defendants with a Mental Retardation Claim, 26 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 43
(2008).
76 Id. at 54–56.
77 Id. at 55.
78 Id. at 57.
79 Id. at 55.
80 See Daniel J. Reschly & Susan M. Ward, Use of Adaptive Behavior Measures and
Overrepresentation of Black Students in Programs for Students with Mild Mental Retar-
dation, 96 AM. J. ON MENTAL RETARDATION 257, 265 (1991) (comparing adaptive performance
of Black and Anglo school children, and finding that while Black children scored slightly
higher on three of the eight categories, there was no overall statistical significance); see also
Ellis M. Craig & Marc J. Tassé, Cultural and Demographic Group Comparisons of Adaptive
Behavior, in ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR AND ITS MEASUREMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FIELD
OF MENTAL RETARDATION 119 (Robert L. Schalock & David L. Braddock eds., 1999). The
authors provide an overview of cultural differences in child rearing and expectations for
some groups as well as the research of measured differences in adaptive behavior on various
instruments. The research summary shows no conclusive findings. However, the authors
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validation procedures for the three major instruments recommended for use in Atkins
cases indicates all were normed using stratified samplings representing the most recent
census data at the time of validation.81
Second, in regard to poor motivation, the fact that the individual indicated he
did not want to perform tasks does not lead to the conclusion that he could. Without
interviewing informants across several settings, it is unknowable whether there were
attempts to teach the individual, if he could perform the action competently, or even
if he learned the behavior; there would not be enough information to show the
learned behavior could be displayed in a community context and over time.
Third, although one scale (ABAS-II) allows for the use of the individual as
an informant in certain circumstances,82 professional association guidelines dis-
courage this approach as persons with ID often lack insight and have limited self-
awareness.83 Further, a long-established core characteristic of this disability is to
minimize and deny shortcomings due to the stigma and shame associated with this
label.84 Defendants will frequently inflate accomplishments (faking good) to hide
their disability.85
Denkowski’s assertion that the family is biased and therefore should not be used
flies in the face of accepted standards. A competent evaluator examines the credibility
of all informants.86 If informants are regarded as biased, they are not used or minimum
weight is given to the information they supply.87 In addition, in high-stake evalua-
tions, such as those involved in capital cases, multiple informants (people in addition
to the family such as employers, friends, former teachers) are always recommended.88
suggest evaluators have some degree of cultural competence in the population assessed because
they use clinical judgment when gross discrepancies are found. This suggestion is consistent
with adaptive behavior assessment guidelines in general.
81 See Kay B. Stevens & J. Randall Price, Adaptive Behavior, Mental Retardation, and
the Death Penalty, 6 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 1, 8, 10, 12 (2006) (providing an overview
of the standardization and merits of the Vineland, ABAS-II, and the SIB-R).
82 See Harrison & Rainer, supra note 34, at 616.
83 See AAIDD, supra note 1, at 51.
84 See J. David Smith, Speaking of Mild Mental Retardation: It’s No Box of Chocolates,
or Is It?, 14 EXCEPTIONALITY 191, 200 (2006) (addressing the extreme lengths that individuals
with ID will go to avoid the label); see also ROBERT EDGERTON, THE CLOAK OF COMPETENCE:
STIGMA IN THE LIVES OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 205–09 (2d ed. 1967) (describing the
elaborate ways in which adults with ID worked to hide their disability); ROBERT EDGERTON,
THE CLOAK OF COMPETENCE REVISED AND UPDATED (3d. ed. 1993).
85 See sources cited supra note 84.
86 See Robert L. Schalock, The Merging of Adaptive Behavior and Intelligence: Implications
for the Field of Mental Retardation, in ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR AND ITS MEASUREMENT: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR THE FIELD 43, 52 (Robert L. Schalock & David L. Braddock eds., 1999) (emphasizing
an evaluator’s use of clinical judgment).
87 See Macvaugh & Cunningham, supra note 22, at 165 (describing how best to eliminate
bias, but also emphasizing this bias must be bi-directionally considered).
88 Tassé, Adaptive Behavior Assessment, supra note 31, at 120.
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Finally, it is inappropriate to use actions of the crime to evaluate adaptive
behavior.89 To determine actual functioning in any context, it is necessary to do
extensive interviews to gain information on the amount of assistance and guidance
the individual needed and the degree of competence he displayed in the setting.90
Such an approach would necessitate the evaluator to become entangled in the facts
of the case, which is an inappropriate role.91
The fact that the Denkowskis published their recommendations made them
accessible to the professional community. The recommendations were denounced
as invalid92 and the Texas Board of Examiners levied a fine and banned Dr. George
Denkowski from conducting assessments of ID in Atkins cases.93 Unfortunately, he
acted as an expert in at least twenty-five Atkins cases, the majority for the state, and
at least fourteen people were on death row at the time of his sanction in 2011.94
The preceding examples demonstrate that accurate evaluation of Atkins claimants
requires a high level of competence in assessing and diagnosing ID. In the last twenty
years, the field of forensic psychology has increased its emphasis on presenting work
that is based on scientific evidence and objective measurement through practice
standards promulgated by groups such as the American Psychology and Law Society
(AP-LS) and American Psychological Association (APA).95 An examination of the
2011 Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology reveals standards on competence
to provide services in a particular manner, gaining and maintaining this competence,
and knowledge of scientific foundation for opinions and testimony.96 Yet, with re-
gard to Atkins evaluations, many evaluators have not acted in accordance with these
guidelines.97 While there is a significant body of forensic literature on the practice of
presenting psychiatric and mental health information to the courts, there currently
exists very little guidance for presenting evidence in an Atkins claim, other than the
occasional law review or journal article on the topic.98 Further, in spite of the fact
89 Macvaugh & Cunningham, supra note 22, at 166.
90 Everington & Olley, supra note 24, at 10.
91 Id.
92 See Keith F. Widaman & Gary N. Siperstein, Assessing Adaptive Behavior of Criminal
Defendants in Capital Cases: A Reconsideration, 27 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 5, 13 (2009)
(providing a comprehensive argument against Dr. Denkowski’s approach).
93 John H. Blume & Karen L. Salekin, Analysis of Atkins Cases, in THE DEATH PENALTY
AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: A GUIDE (Edward Polloway ed., 2014).
94 Id.
95 See Randy K. Otto & Kirk Heilbrun, The Practice of Forensic Psychology: A Look to
the Future in Light of the Past, 57 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 5 (2002) (describing the growth of
the study of forensic psychology through the years).
96 See Am. Psychol. Ass’n, Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology, 68 AM.
PSYCHOL. 7, 8 (2013).
97 See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text (highlighting the lack of guidance in
Atkins evaluations).
98 See generally GARY B MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE
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that there has been an explosion in specialty area guidelines on forensic assessment,
such as with competence to stand trial99 and the assessment of juveniles,100 there are
no authoritative forensic texts, or even sections of texts, on diagnosis of ID in forensic
settings.101 Given the lack of attention to this topic by authoritative sources in the field
of forensic psychology and psychiatry, it is not surprising to find invalid practices
employed in some of these cases.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF PROCEDURES ARTICULATED BY COURTS AND LEGISLATURES
At the heart of the issue is wider acceptance and understanding by the courts and
legislatures of the standards of practice in the field of ID.102 The lack of recognition
of expertise in this area has resulted in legislation and court rulings that establish
precedence or guidelines for diagnosis of ID that have little or no basis in the sci-
entific literature on ID, making a just finding in an Atkins case very difficult.103 A
few of the more prominent procedures that have been promulgated since Atkins will
be discussed.
The first issue concerns the definition of ID (mental retardation) adopted by the
state. The Court in Atkins encouraged states to reference the guidelines established by
professional associations, either the AAIDD or DSM-5, for crafting their definitions.104
While many have adopted a definition that incorporates the three prongs, others have
their own uniquely worded definition.105 The issue of greatest contention is the states
that have adopted a definition with a rigid, bright-line IQ cut-off of 70.106 In addi-
tion, a few states have no provision for consideration of the accepted standard error
COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS (3d ed. 2007).
This leading authoritative guide does not have a section on Atkins evaluations.
99 See THOMAS GRISSO, COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL: JUST THE BASICS (2013); THOMAS
GRISSO ET AL., EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS
69-149 (2d ed. 2003); PATRICIA ZAPH & RONALD ROESCH, EVALUATION OF COMPETENCE
TO STAND TRIAL (2009).
100 See THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING JUVENILES’ ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: A GUIDE
FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE (2005); THOMAS GRISSO, FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES (2d
ed. 2013); IVAN KRUH & THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATION OF JUVENILES’ COMPETENCE TO
STAND TRIAL (2009).
101 Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 43, at 815 (suggesting that ID capital cases should
have specialty area forensic assessment guidelines like competence to stand trial or assessment
of juveniles).
102 Id. at 860.
103 See id. at 819.
104 See id. (noting that the Court used these definitions in its analysis).
105 James R. Patton & Denis W. Keyes, Death Penalty Issues Following Atkins, 14
EXCEPTIONALITY 237, 243 (2006).
106 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1996 (2014) (noting that Virginia, Kentucky, and
Alabama have a bright line cut-off of 70; Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, North Carolina, and
Washington have laws that could be interpreted as a bright line cut-off).
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of measure or for other important considerations such as the Flynn Effect.107 The
constriction of information needed to make an accurate finding greatly increases the
chances of an incorrect ruling (i.e., under-identification of ID).108
The most notable case involving bright-line definitions is the recent Supreme Court
decision in Hall v. Florida.109 The Florida Supreme Court ruled against Hall because
he scored above 70 on several IQ tests, and Florida law sets 70 as a strict numerical
cutoff.110 An additional, important aspect of the Florida law is that the claimant has
to show an IQ of 70 or below before presenting evidence of deficits in adaptive be-
havior or developmental on-set, a practice that is counter to diagnostic criteria pro-
mulgated by the AAIDD and DSM-5, which require concurrent consideration.111
In Hall, the Court held that Florida’s threshold, as interpreted by the Florida
Supreme Court, was unconstitutional.112 The Court upheld the Eighth Amendment
prohibition of execution of persons with intellectual disabilities, noting that it is proper
to consider psychiatric and professional studies that elaborate on the purpose and
meaning of IQ scores and how those scores relate to Atkins.113 Further, the Court
held that Florida’s rule disregarded established medical practice in two ways: “It takes
an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a defendant’s intellectual capacity,
when experts in the field would consider other evidence,” and it “relies on a purport-
edly scientific measurement of the defendant’s abilities,” while refusing to recognize
that measurement’s inherent imprecision.114
Hall is an important finding for the field for several reasons. First, the broad im-
plication is that it affirms the role of professional standards in the diagnosis of ID in
Atkins cases.115 Second, more specifically, it affirms accepted standards in intellectual
assessment: the standard error of measure and the relative imprecision of IQ.116 Third,
it affirms the role of examining concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior as an inte-
gral part of the diagnostic process.117 As a result, it is anticipated that many current
Florida death row cases will be remanded.118 It will be interesting to see how broadly
Hall will affect other jurisdictions.
107 Id.
108 See Tasse, Adaptive Behavior Assessment, supra note 31, at 120 (emphasizing the
need for a comprehensive evaluation).
109 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1988–89.
110 Id. at 1992.
111 Id. at 1992; see AAIDD, supra note 1, at 45.
112 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1988–89.
113 Id. at 1993.
114 Id. at 1995.
115 Id. at 2001 (finding Florida’s law in direct opposition to views of experts in the field).
116 Id. at 2000 (highlighting that IQ scores are approximations and not “final and infallible”).
117 Id. (affirming Atkins rule that evidence of difficulties with adaptive functioning are
relevant in ID determinations).
118 See id. at 2001 (striking down Florida’s rigid ban on presenting evidence of adaptive
functioning for those individuals with IQs over 70).
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Possibly the most controversial decision which severely restricts the diagnosis
of ID is Ex parte Briseno, which lists diagnosis factors recommended by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals.119 Briseno requires the court to consider seven factors
when determining deficits in adaptive behavior.120 Factor one requires a lay diagno-
sis of ID during development,121 which is counter to research on the developmental
trajectory of mild ID, which indicates the disability often goes undetected in early
years.122 Factors two through six (carrying out plans, responding to questions, re-
sponding appropriately to stimuli)123 reflect typical capabilities for individuals who
function in the mild ID range.124 Finally, factor seven uses the facts of the crime as
part of the diagnostic process,125 a practice recognized by professionals as inappro-
priate for reasons stated earlier in this Paper.126 Using these seven factors as part of
a diagnosis has the potential (if strictly interpreted) to exclude anyone functioning
in the mild ID range from the protection of Atkins. It appears that these factors are
used frequently in Texas127 and, unfortunately, there is evidence that these criteria
have been used in cases in Oklahoma and Utah as well.128
The preceding examples demonstrate the difficulty for the evaluator in present-
ing ID evidence to a judge or jury and the relative weight in which that evidence is
119 See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8–9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
[1.] Did those who knew the person best during the developmental
stage—his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he
was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that
determination? [2.] Has the person formulated plans and carried them
through or is his conduct impulsive? [3.] Does his conduct show leader-
ship or does it show that he is led around by others? [4.] Is his conduct
in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of
whether it is socially acceptable? [5.] Does he respond coherently,
rationally, and on point to oral or written questions or do his responses
wander from subject to subject? [6.] Can the person hide facts or lie
effectively in his own or others’ interests? [7.] Putting aside any heinous-
ness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did the commis-
sion of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex execution
of purpose?
Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 8.
122 See Reschly, supra note 35, at 128.
123 Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8.
124 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 84 (describing real and fictional accounts of those with
mild intellectual disabilities).
125 Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8–9.
126 See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
127 See, e.g., Ex parte Butler, 416 S.W.3d 863, 874–75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (describing
the use of the Briseno factors in determining adaptive functioning).
128 See Steven Greenspan, Briseno Factors, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY: A GUIDE (Edward Polloway ed., 2014).
482 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:467
given. If important evidence is not allowed, or not given appropriate consideration,
accurate decisions cannot be reached. However, not all courts have disregarded the
scientific information and diagnostic standards in regarding ID.129 There are many
examples of a growing understanding in certain jurisdictions. In regards to assess-
ment of IQ, a California court found Atkins claimant Jorge Vidal as having ID in spite
of the fact that his full-scale IQ scores ranged from borderline to average.130 Because
his verbal IQ was consistently in the ID range, and because he met prongs two and
three, the California Supreme Court affirmed this decision, noting that because Atkins
does not incorporate the set requirement of a specific test score, there was no error
in the trial court giving greater weight to one piece of evidence (his verbal IQ) over
another (his full-scale IQ).131
In a case involving battling experts, United States v. Shields,132 a district court in
Tennessee found the ID experts who testified for the claimant to be substantially more
credible, as they employed accepted practices in their approach, and found the opinions
of the government experts to be unsubstantiated and based on stereotypical notions of
ID.133 The recent Court ruling in Hall may indeed raise the bar in many jurisdictions.
In summary, the court and legislative procedures developed in some jurisdictions
in the post-Atkins era have limited the ability of fact finders to make accurate decisions
about ID.
IV. UNIQUE CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY THE ATKINS CLAIMANT
Aside from the complications of legislative and court rulings that hamstring
evaluators, the Atkins claim presents unique issues even for the most experienced
evaluator. The Atkins claimants who have been incarcerated for years or even decades
(delayed trial or post-conviction) present the greatest evaluation challenge.134 With
the passage of time, important school and medical records are lost, and parents and
other key informants are deceased or may have disappeared. Further, the Atkins claim-
ant may have become institutionalized and may no longer display some of the deficits
that were present at the time of incarceration.135 That is, literacy skills may have
improved through years of time with print material and mathematical computation
129 See infra notes 130–33.
130 See Bruce Gross, Gray Matter: Redefining Mental Retardation in Capital Cases,
FORENSIC EXAMINER, Fall 2007, at 57.
131 Id. at 59.
132 United States v. Shields, No. 04-20254, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130612 (W.D. Tenn.
May 11, 2009).
133 Id. at 13–20.
134 See Stevens & Price, supra note 81, at 15–16 (emphasizing retrospective evaluations
should be approached cautiously and highlighting that no retrospective evaluation was normed
for the length of time defendants are incarcerated).
135 See Brodsky & Galloway, supra note 44, at 7 (highlighting the difficulties of evaluating
institutionalized environments).
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through calculation of canteen balances for years. As stated earlier, these behaviors
do not preclude a diagnosis of ID but can be easily misinterpreted by inexperienced
evaluators.136 Additionally, the question in the Atkins proceeding is generally not
present functioning, but rather functioning at the time of incarceration.137
Cases with these unique challenges are exceedingly difficult and highlight the
need for examiners who have a depth of knowledge in ID assessment and diagnosis.
The most difficult parts of the evaluation are prongs two and three. Prong two, presence
of deficits in adaptive skills, requires information on functioning in community
settings.138 The process necessitates what has been referred to as retrospective evalua-
tion, which entails referencing the abilities and skills displayed by the defendant prior
to incarceration.139 While this process has always been used for adaptive assessment
in difficult situations, Atkins claims have resulted in the development of refined pro-
cedures and professional guidelines.140
While the time period preceding the offense is the most common reference point,
it may also be necessary to investigate adaptive functioning during the developmental
period.141 Retrospective evaluation entails locating informants who can provide infor-
mation on his functioning in various settings (e.g., school, home, work).142 Locating
a sufficient number of knowledgeable informants requires considerable time and
effort. To insure validity, multiple informants are used and, in some cases, a stronger
emphasis is placed on structured interviews.143 A process of convergent validity is
used to combine information from across a number of informants.144 The importance
of professional judgment of an experienced evaluator in this type of evaluation cannot
be overemphasized.145
136 See Tassé, Adaptive Behavior Assessment, supra note 31, at 121.
137 See Stevens & Price, supra note 81, at 15 (discussing that often times evaluations for
defendants are done for a time in the past and not the present).
138 See AAIDD, supra note 1, at 43 (defining adaptive behavior).
139 See Stevens & Price, supra note 81, at 15–16.
140 For AAIDD guidelines on retrospective assessment see ROBERT L. SCHALOCK ET AL.,
USER’S GUIDE: TO ACCOMPANY THE 11TH EDITION OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORT 20–21 (11th ed. 2012); ROBERT L. SCHALOCK
ET AL., USERS GUIDE: MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS
OF SUPPORT 17–22 (10th ed. 2007).
141 See J. Gregory Olley, Time in Which the Disability Must be Shown in Atkins Cases,
in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: A GUIDE (Edward Polloway ed.,
2014) (reviewing the requirements of different states for the time at which ID must be
proven).
142 See Stevens & Price, supra note 81, at 15 (describing that informants must recall the
defendant’s adaptive behavior functioning at an earlier time).
143 Tassé, Adaptive Behavior Assessment, supra note 31, at 120.
144 Id. at 109.
145 See J. Gregory Olley, Definition of Intellectual Disability in Criminal Court Cases, 51
INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 117, 119 (2013).
484 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:467
In addition, the court should be reminded that strengths coexist with deficits in
all individuals with ID, and that individuals with ID can acquire skills over time.146
Skill acquisition in some areas does not preclude the diagnosis of ID.147
V. NEW DIRECTIONS: STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR ATKINS EVALUATIONS
Cognizant of these concerns, professional disability groups have called for profes-
sional standards for Atkins cases.148 This does not imply the development of new stan-
dards but, rather, the refinement of accepted diagnostic procedures for the unique
circumstances of Atkins cases.149 A few promising initiatives will be mentioned.
In 2005, the American Psychological Association Division 33 (Psychology in
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities) created the ad hoc Committee on Mental
Retardation and the Death Penalty.150 The focus of the committee has been to en-
courage adoption of standards of practice in Atkins evaluations through professional
publications and presentations.151
In 2008, AAIDD and Arc of United States152 developed a joint position state-
ment calling for justice and fair treatment for people with intellectual and develop-
mental disabilities in all areas of the criminal justice system, including the right to
have available to them judges, lawyers, prosecutors, court personnel and others who
are educated about the effects of their disability.153 In regard to capital cases, they
must have the right to have their ID determined by state procedures that are accurate
and fair.154
In 2010, AAIDD convened a task force of professionals (e.g., mental health and
mental disability professionals and attorneys), who have significant experience in
ID and Atkins litigation, to focus on the implications of the Atkins decision.155 The
146 AAIDD, supra note 1, at 1.
147 Id.
148 See infra notes 149–57.
149 Id.
150 See J. Gregory Olley, Update on the Committee on Mental Retardation and the Death
Penalty, 35 PSYCHOL. INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 5 (2009) (recommending
that procedures used in Atkins hearings be grounded in standard practices for diagnosis of
ID espoused by AAIDD, APA, and the American Psychiatric Association).
151 See id.
152 See Mission & Values, THE ARC, http://www.thearc.org/who-we-are/mission-and
-values (last visited Dec. 1, 2014). The Arc is an association advocating for human rights and
full inclusion for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities. Id.
153 See AAIDD Board of Directors, Criminal Justice Joint Position Statement of AAIDD
and The Arc, AAIDD (Aug. 2008), http://aaidd.org/news-policy/policy/position-statements
/criminal-justice.
154 Id.
155 Kevin McGrew, AAIDD Death Penalty Task Force: ICDP Conflict of Interest Disclosure,
INTELL. COMPETENCE & DEATH PENALTY (May 5, 2010, 9:01 AM), http://www.atkinsmr
deathpenalty.com/2010/05/aaidd-death-penalty-task-force-icdp.html.
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outcome of the AAIDD task force has been the publication of a manual on best prac-
tices in forensic evaluation of individuals with ID.156 The purpose of the manual is
to present accurate, nonbiased information that reflects the most current views of the
science of diagnostics for intellectual disabilities as related to the criminal justice
system in general, but for capital cases in particular.157 The publication of an authori-
tative guide such as this manual is an important step in meeting the goal for more just
outcomes for individuals with ID. The next steps include intensifying training efforts
for consumers of forensic evaluations of individuals with ID.
CONCLUSION
The implementation of Atkins has been more complex than the courts and profes-
sional associations probably ever imagined.158 There have been battles over every
aspect of the clinical diagnosis: the definition, the type of testing, the interpretation
of assessment results and historical records, and the conclusions reached from this
information. It has become apparent that considerable misinformation exists among
clinical and legal professionals. The protection afforded by Atkins will not be realized
for all claimants if judges and juries are not presented with accurate information that
is based on scientific knowledge and professional standards. The severe consequences
for the Atkins claimant are obvious.
These are very difficult and complex cases even for those who have a spent a
professional lifetime working in this area. Evaluations in Atkins cases are thorough
and expansive and require considerable expertise. Because of the clinical nature of
this type of litigation, it is incumbent upon the professional communities to ensure
implementation of professional practice standards.
Finally, overcoming deeply held stereotypical notions is critical for accurate court
and legislative rulings.159 This calls for more vigorous efforts for education on the
nature and detection of intellectual disability.
156 Everington et al., supra note 33.
157 Id.
158 Haydt et al., supra note 21, at 362.
159 Blume & Salekin, supra note 93.
